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THE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF 'OBJECTIVITY' 
The Limits of Law in 
Regulating Health Care Decisions 
by ROBERT A. BURT 
The case for legal regulation of biomedical technology 
used to be easy to argue. A decade ago, it was clear 
that this technology had a dramatic impact on issues of 
far-reaching public significance, that many of these issues 
were not being systematically addressed by anyone, and 
that others were being considered only by physicians and 
biological scientists from a very narrow perspective. The 
argument for systematic law-making in the resolution of 
these issues was easy and, during the past few years, that 
argument seems in large part to have prevailed. Congres- 
sional establishment of the National Commission for Pro- 
tection of Human Subjects of Behavioral and Biomedical 
Research, with its wide-ranging statutory jurisdiction, is 
one indication of this trend. The California "Natural 
Death Act" is another. A third indication is the current 
willingness of judges to enter into previously sacrosanct 
medical territory, to proclaim principles of "informed con- 
sent" for doctor/patient relations or "rights to treatment" 
for institutionalized mentally ill or retarded persons. 
There is of course considerable controversy about the 
substance of these new legal rules. But there seems to be 
remarkable agreement on one underlying premise-that 
there should be new rules. Thus, although many doctors 
may be arguing for their traditional prerogatives to make 
treatment choices for their patients, few doctors are argu- 
ing against clarification of the rules by legislatures or courts. 
This is the attitude that always underlies calls for some 
authoritative resolution of disputed matters-for law-mak- 
ing. There are, however, some special dangers in succumb- 
ing too readily to this attitude for many disputed issues. In 
advancing this view, I want to say a few words in praise 
of those much-maligned characters Uncertainty and Con- 
fusion, and their frequent companions Ambivalence, Anxi- 
ety, and even Irrationality. 
"Ideal" Parents as Objective Decision Makers 
Let me begin my argument in a context that has received 
some attention by law reform advocates-parental choice 
of medical care for children. Some legal rules are of course 
inevitably required to answer the question who decides 
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medical care for children (even if the answer is that chil- 
dren decide for themselves). The traditional answer, with 
stringently limited exceptions, has been that parents de- 
cide. But that answer is under sustained assault today. The 
Supreme Court has already decided that parents may not 
veto their pregnant child's decision to have an abortion. 
No physician today will perform a kidney transplant be- 
tween siblings without court approval of the parents' 
decision. Lower federal courts have ruled that parents may 
not place their child in a psychiatric institution unless an 
attorney is chosen to give the child independent repre- 
sensation; if the adolescent child or the attorney for a 
younger child protests this psychiatric placement, a court 
must decide the matter. 
The traditional rule has been called into question by 
the recognition that parents and children have ambivalent 
feelings toward one another, though "recognition" may 
be too mild a word to convey the sense of shock and even 
outrage that can be heard in current advocacy for law 
changes. The "discovery" of ambivalence between parent 
and child, of the possibility that their interests may con- 
flict, is the perception expressed in court opinions and re- 
formist literature in this matter, as if the traditional rule 
deferring to parental decisions were premised on a wholly 
benevolent and unambivalent attitude of parents toward 
children. 
The law reform advocates reason thus: the ideal health 
care decision-maker is "objective," "rational," "detached." 
In those matters where parents are likely to be ambivalent 
and to have interests conflicting with their child's interests, 
parents no longer qualify as ideal decision makers. Ac- 
cordingly, the argument runs, it is appropriate in these situ- 
ations to have the decision made by an outsider who can 
more closely approximate the detached and rational ideal 
-a judge, that is, who guides his decisions by public 
norms in law. 
This implicit praise of objectivity in decision making is 
the essential law-reform attitude. This ideal directly paral- 
lels, and has been significantly influenced by, the ethos of 
science itself, the ethos of objectivity in science. Current 
law reform efforts to interpose a judge between parent 
and child, in order to assure "rationality," "objectivity," 
"detachment" in health care decisions for the child, has its 
precise psychological analogy in the biomedical science's 
interposition of technology, of machines, between doctor 
and patient in order to vindicate the same supposed virtues. 
Of course judges are not machines; neither are doctors. 
Both, however, have powerful professional role commit- 
ments to act like machines, to treat litigants or patients as 
interchangeable entities. This is not intended as a pejorative 
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characterization. The ideal of equal justice under law, of 
assuring the governance of "laws not men," of treating 
"like cases alike" with fine impartiality expresses a con- 
ception of interchangeability on both sides of the legal rela- 
tionship. These ideals suggest that a judge should be inter- 
changeable with any other judge in reaching the same result 
for any litigant, just as any litigant should be interchange- 
able with any other before the same judge. Doctors equally 
hold to the normative proposition that any patient exhibit- 
ing symptom A should be diagnosed as suffering from 
malady B and treated by therapeutic modality C-no matter 
what the patient's religion, politics, or personal values. 
Deviations from these computer-like norms occur every 
day among practitioners in both professions. But these devi- 
ations are not seen as occasions for self-congratulation, as 
virtues to be pursued, but rather as errors to be corrected, 
perhaps by appeal to a higher court or by recourse to a 
more certain diagnostic technique, or-if the highest court 
or best conceivable technique has ruled in the matter-as 
errors to be tolerated for the moment, but without pride. 
The application of impersonal standards of judgment, in 
both law and medicine, is intended to guard against in- 
appropriate conflicts of interest in a number of different 
senses. For judges and for doctors, the notion of "conflict 
of interest" has an obvious financial connotation-that a 
judge should not personally profit from his decision in liti- 
gation and, equally, that a physician should not choose sur- 
gery over nontreatment simply because he will earn more 
money from the surgical procedure. But there is a more 
profound underlying notion of interests in conflict for both 
professions. This notion is most evident in the norm that 
judges should not rule "in their own causes" and should 
have no direct personal stake in the outcome of the liti- 
gation. Judges are instructed, that is, to control-indeed, 
to banish-(as if that were possible)-their own narcissistic 
identifications with the litigants before them. Judges are 
directed by their professional norms to keep distance be- 
tween themselves and those over whom they exercise 
authority, not to confuse themselves with those dependent 
on them. 
This same norm for physicians has been explicitly prom- 
ulgated in psychiatric practice where the injunction to scru- 
tinize countertransference-the psychiatrist's emotional re- 
sponse to his patient-has both a technical therapeutic and 
a normative implication. The normative implication of this 
injunction, at least, is not limited to psychotherapy. The 
injunction purports to extend throughout medical practice, 
and it forms the ethical basis for the canon that a physician 
should solicit and respect the patient's wishes in treatment 
matters because the physician is not the patient, the patient 
is the patient. The professional impropriety seen in con- 
flicts of interest between judge and litigant, or between doc- 
tor and patient, at base expresses the same normative in- 
struction: don't confuse yourself with this person who is 
dependent on you. 
This confusion of selves is, however, a classically ob- 
served and approved attribute of typical relations between 
parent and child. The intense bonding, the profound narcis- 
sistic identification, that exist between parent and child- 
experienced by both with special intensity during infancy- 
has traditionally been viewed as an essential defining char- 
acteristic of the relationship rather than as a psychological 
problem or aberration to be overcome. Nonetheless, here 
too the scientific ethos has significantly altered the way that 
parent/child relations are popularly perceived, even in the 
idea that children have "rights" which state officials should 
enforce against their parents. 
In this century Freudian psychology offered the first 
systematic elaboration of the idea that children were not 
simply "unformed adults" who were to be shaped, even 
forced, to grow into human status, but that children's psy- 
chology had its own internal logic which commanded inde- 
pendent respect. Beginning in the 1920s and 30s in this 
country, and still today, parents have looked for advice 
about childrearing from professionals who spoke from this 
perspective. The notion of parenthood as a profession, of 
rules to be learned and expertise to be developed, was 
built on the premise that a "good parent" views his chil- 
dren with a clear-headed sense of their individuality and 
a careful respect for their "independent rights"-views 
them, that is, "objectively," "dispassionately." 
This perspective readily lends itself to invitations for 
state superintendence of parental decisions where it ap- 
pears that this norm of parental "objectivity" is under 
particular stress-kidney transplant between siblings, abor- 
tion for a pregnant child, psychiatric hospitalization for a 
child. This normative valuation of parental objectivity, of 
the "good parent" as the expert applier of the best-con- 
sidered rules for childrearing, readily suggests the essential 
interchangeability of parents and judges. The "good par- 
ent," that is, behaves like a "good judge," and therefore 
a "good judge" can easily-indeed, interchangeably-eval- 
uate what a "good parent" would do in any particular 
circumstance. 
This new attitude is not drawn from statistically based 
inquiries into the prevalence of "good" or "bad" parental 
decisions in health care matters. The attention and the ac- 
ceptance accorded to the new rule do not follow from a 
sudden discovery that more parents are "unwise" than had 
been supposed. Rather, these new rules seem plausible and 
even attractive because of a subtle shift in social attitudes 
which posits the interchangeability of parents and judges- 
the normative objectification of the childrearing enter- 
prise. The old legal rule conclusively presumed that parents 
spoke for children because that rule was built on the un- 
questioned psychological premise of a fundamental iden- 
tity, a confusion of "selves" between parents and child. The 
new rules are not intended conclusively to displace parental 
authority to speak for children. But they build from a very 
different psychological normative premise: that it is impor- 
tant for parents to keep their conception of themselves quite 
separate from their conception of the children's "selves." 
From this perspective, proponents of the new rules are 
able to argue that little of value is lost, and much can be 
gained, by providing outside supervision of parental deci- 
sions when their capacity for keeping their self-conception, 
their self-interest, distinct from their child's separate inter- 
est and separate "self" might suffer greatest stress. 
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Objectivity in Physician-Patient Relationships 
I have sketched the subtle conceptual changes that have 
yielded norms of "objectivity" in parenthood because 1 
think these same issues underlie current social attitudes 
toward regulation of the provision of medical care generally, 
toward relations betwen doctor and patient. The social 
roles of doctor and judge have become interchangeable in 
ways that parallel-and indeed anticipate-this pheno- 
menon for parents. The intense bonding, the narcissistic 
identifications, the confusions of "selves" which are para- 
digmatic in the parent/infant relationship also powerfully 
reverberate in traditional notions of charismatic medicine, 
the magical "laying on of hands" that brings psychological 
relief and physical cure to desperately ill patients. The 
development of scientific medicine sits with great discom- 
fort alongside this more ancient healing tradition. Scientific 
medicine cannot ignore the claims of the ancient healing 
arts, if only because the placebo effect has been verified 
by the rigorous norms of empirical observation that are 
the very foundation of scientific medicine. But the scien- 
tific observational method itself posits a separation be- 
tween the observer and the external world, between the 
scientist and his subject, between the doctor and his pa- 
tient that cuts against the psychology of charismatic medi- 
cine. This scientific ethos does not yield comfortably to the 
contradictory psychological premises of reciprocally merged 
ego boundaries that are characteristic both of charismatic 
medicine and of charismatic parenting. To a rigorous bio- 
logical scientist, this "confusion of selves" between two 
separate people is just that-a confusion, an irrationality, 
madness even. 
Scientific medicine has had great triumphs in the past 
half-century. Its mechanistic, impersonal assumptions about 
the functioning of the human body have led to impressive 
therapeutic advances. The end of these advances and the 
continued vitality of these underlying assumptions are not 
yet in sight. It is, however, a commonplace criticism of 
scientific medicine that its practitioners, because of their 
objectifying mind-set, rivet attention on the disease and 
lose sight of the patient. There is thus at least some para- 
dox that those who complain of impersonal, dehumanized 
medicine turn now for remedies to the legal system that 
prizes its systematic impersonality, its governance by laws 
not men. 
But there is more than paradox here. For in the effort 
to rationalize, to bring order to the relationship between 
doctor and patient or parent and child, I believe we are 
disregarding and even loosening the central psychological 
bonds that have kept in check some extraordinarily de- 
structive forces implicit in these relationships. The very 
attempt to order these relations implies an assumption that 
may seem self-evident-that the relationship is a transac- 
tion between two separate people. But this assumption is 
not necessarily self-evident to the participants. There are in 
fact powerful forces inevitably at work in the psyches of 
both doctor and patient, both parent and child, that deny 
this psychological separateness between them. The sense 
of boundaries can be maintained-quite rigorously, indeed 
-if this separate self-conception is sufficiently valued. The 
maintenance of such rigorous boundaries has not only a 
liberating and humane implication, but is also the psycho- 
logical precondition for infliction of extraordinary brutality. 
The Brutality of Separation of Self 
This point is graphically demonstrated in a series of 
experiments conducted several years ago by Stanley Mil- 
gram. Milgram's subjects were led to believe that they were 
conducting learning experiments which required them to 
administer electric shocks of mounting severity to another 
person, a "learner," to induce him to memorize certain 
word associations. During the experiment, the supposed 
learner objected in varying ways to the administration of 
these shocks; when the subjects questioned whether they 
should continue, a laboratory technician supposedly in 
charge of the experiment instructed them to proceed. A 
considerable proportion of the subjects did so, inflicting 
on the first-protesting and then-silent learner shocks that 
were apparently severe enough to kill him. 
In several ways these experiments suggest the propo- 
sition I am advancing about the inhumane implications of 
rigid separation of self from others. First, the subjects' 
willingness to obey the technician's directives, and to con- 
tinue administration of the electric shocks, varied system- 
atically depending on their physicial proximity to the 
learner. Almost two-thirds of the subjects followed the 
directives, though not without protest and visible strain, 
when the learner/victim was in another room, while about 
one-third of the subjects were willing to continue the 
shocks when the learner/victim was seated beside them 
and they were required to press his hand onto a metal plate 
to administer the shocks. 
But even this latter result is astounding testimony to the 
inhumane potential in people. The critical question is how 
this potential was activated. The likely answer suggests a 
second brutalizing implication of the psychology of science, 
of the "objective observer." I believe the answer is to be 
found in the rigid separation between self and other that 
the subjects were able to maintain by believing that their 
actions did not "belong" to them at all, that their actions in 
fact "belonged" to the technician who, in response to their 
protests or questions, repeatedly accepted "full responsi- 
bility" for the actions. These subjects, that is, depersonal- 
ized themselves, made themselves into objective instru- 
ments, rule-followers, embodiments of the scientific method 
in order to silence that part of their psyches that empa- 
thized with the learner/victim, that confused the question 
whether he was separate from or the same as them. 
The third aspect of these experiments that demonstrates 
the brutal implications of the scientific ethos is the fact 
that the experiments were conducted at all. The subjects 
were not alone in inflicting shocks on a victim whom they 
had good reason to believe would suffer greatly from their 
actions. Milgram and his associates acted in the same way 
for several years with several thousand different subjects. 
Milgram claims that his follow-up studies of these sub- 
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jects indicate that none has suffered any adverse psycho- 
logical consequences from his participation, whether or 
not he obeyed the technician's directives to administer the 
ultimate shock levels. But during the conduct of these ex- 
periments, the subjects all showed extreme stress, and Mil- 
gram could not then have known with any certainty that 
no adverse consequence would result. 
The learner/victim of course was an actor and the 
shocks were faked, and so deception was added to the 
other indignities generously heaped on the subjects by the 
experimenter. The central lesson, however, does not lie in 
the deception practiced by Milgram; it lies rather in the 
deception that all these participants practiced on them- 
selves. Though three human beings participated in each 
of these experiments-the subject, the learner/victim, and 
the experimenter-there were no fully flesh-and-blood 
people there. There were only three actors pretending 
to be someone else, to be somewhere else; no one ac- 
cepted responsibility for truly being there, for feeling an- 
other's pain as if it were his own. No one accepted per- 
sonal responsibility for the actions that inflicted visible 
pain on the other. This is the ultimate expression of, and 
the ultimate parody of, a government of laws not men. 
The Dangers of Rationality 
This same brutal parody potentially lies within many 
proposed legal reforms to regulate biomedical technology. 
The physician who is now instructed to obey the "informed 
consent" of his patient, no matter how harmful he feels that 
action to be for the patient, is not only permitted but 
positively enjoined to separate himself from his patient, to 
respect his patient's "autonomy" by suppressing his own 
identifications, his self-confusions, with that patient. The 
danger here is not so much in the norm as in overpuncti- 
lious compliance with the norm. Thus, when the patient 
formerly said, "I want to die,'' the traditional practitioner 
acted as if no one had spoken, and proceeded as if he, the 
doctor, were the patient and the patient were not there at 
all as a separate human being. I hold no brief for this 
rigidly single-minded narcissism. 
But the underlying impetus of the new legal reforms 
under the banner of "patient autonomy" presses to the 
opposite extreme, that the doctor should act as if he were 
not there at all but must simply obey the patient's direc- 
tives as Milgram's subjects conceived themselves to have 
no choice but to obey the technician. Thus when the pa- 
tient requests death from a doctor schooled in this new 
regime, the danger is that the doctor will comply with 
great rigor and haste, and even moralistic self-righteous- 
ness. He will do so in order to keep intact the rigidly sepa- 
rated roles prescribed for each, in order to reassure him- 
self that he is not the patient, to reassure himself that he 
does not feel the terror and pain that the patient feels, to 
reassure himself that he will not die because it is only the 
patient who will die. 
Similarly, when a judge supervises parental decisions 
and thus accepts apparent responsibility for the decision 
whether a child should donate his kidney to a sibling or 
whether a comatose child's respirator should be discon- 
nected, the judge can act with the comforting knowledge 
that he and this child are quite separate from one another 
-that the child is not his, that the consequences of this 
decision will not shape his family's life and his self-con- 
ception forever, that he is after all only applying "the 
rules" with an impartial eye or even, as the popular image 
of Lady Justice suggests, with blindfolded eyes. The parents 
and doctors can also reassure themselves with this same 
false comfort-that they are not personally responsible for 
their actions toward the child, but that someone else ac- 
cepts that responsibility-someone who, like Milgram's 
technician, himself disclaims any personal responsibility for 
his actions. 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that the judges 
of the New Jersey Supreme Court purported to resolve the 
issue in Karen Quinlan's case by proclaiming their reliance 
on the wishes of someone who was clearly not there- 
Karen herself, that is, whom the judges explicitly imagined 
might wake up for a moment and announce that she 
wanted her pain to end. It was of course not clear that in 
her comatose state Karen was feeling any pain. Her parents 
were feeling pain, as were her doctors and the judges. But 
the law encouraged all of them to avoid the recognition 
that they were confusing themselves with her by ascribing 
their pain to her. They could avoid this recognition and 
the anxiety that comes from unresolved ambivalence by 
accepting the law's invitation to pretend that no one was 
there but the rule of law. 
I have presented a one-sided argument, and thus per- 
haps conveyed a misleading impression of my own evalua- 
tion of the excesses and brutalities implicit in the tradi- 
tional claims of physicians and parents for unquestioned 
authority over their patients and children. I have not 
stressed this side of the argument because I believe that it 
has been effectively conveyed during the past decade-too 
effectively, too single-mindedly, in my view. The psycho- 
logical premises that underlie the traditionalist and the 
reformist attitudes-whether doctors or parents are psy- 
chologically separate from or share identities with those 
dependent on their care-stand in fundamental contra- 
diction. But the great danger lies, I believe, in forcing a 
choice of one mind-set to the exclusion of the other. I 
think that the present turmoil-the anxiety among doc- 
tors and parents, among patients and children, about their 
proper relations with one another-is the most fruitful and 
protective posture for everyone. It is in this sense that I 
intend, as I said at the beginning of this article, to praise 
Confusion and Uncertainty. 
Law-makers-legislators or judges-have notoriously 
little tolerance for confusion. Biomedical scientists, schooled 
in the objective techniques of modern science, are equally 
averse to disorder. But their impulse to bring rational order 
to the social deployment of biomedical technology has 
inhumane and brutalizing implications. We should view 
this impulse with suspicion. It does not necessarily con- 
trol the dehumanizing aspects of scientific technology, but 
can readily lead us to be controlled by the mechanistic 
imperatives of the technology itself. 
Hastings Center Report, December 1977 32 
